

# **Communications Branch**

## **O S S**

**ITS ORGANIZATION  
AND OPERATIONS**

# COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

## OSS



**SECRET**

If the two machines requested are made available to this office, they will be safeguarded in accordance with Army Regulations and any other instructions which may be applicable.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM J. CONOVAN

**SECRET**

# SECRET

February 2, 1942.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of War.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

We have occasion to send and receive numerous Secret, Confidential and Restricted messages in communication with our branch office in London.

At the present time all our messages are sent in cryptographic form through a single cryptographic channel. Since this channel handles messages classified as Secret, it is necessary, for the protection of the system, to classify all traffic handled in this system as Secret. This in turn has created problems in distribution and dissemination of information received in cryptographic communications because information which is in fact but Confidential or Restricted in character can be given only the limited circulation of Secret material.

The logical solution would appear to be to provide a separate cryptographic channel to handle Secret messages so that wider distribution of information received in messages of other classifications could be accomplished.

I would, therefore, greatly appreciate it if you would authorize the Chief Signal Officer to transfer to our office two of your most modern electric cipher machines for use between our office in Washington and the London office which is located in the American Embassy.

Lieutenant L. T. Jones, U. S. Coast Guard, is detailed to duty in this office and has charge of our Cryptographic Section. Lieutenant Jones has completed a two year training course in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer and is familiar with the precautions to be taken in the safeguarding of equipment of this nature.

# SECRET

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Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

February 3, 1942.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of War.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

We have occasion to send and receive numerous Secret, Confidential and Restricted messages in communication with our branch office in London.

At the present time all our messages are sent in cryptographic form through a single cryptographic channel. Since this channel handles messages classified as Secret, it is necessary, for the protection of the system, to classify all traffic handled in this system as Secret. This in turn has created problems in distribution and dissemination of information received in cryptographic communications because information which is in fact but Confidential or Restricted in character can be given only the limited circulation of Secret material.

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**SECRET**



**SECRET****WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON**4434  
*Communications  
London*

AG 413.52 (2-2-42)WSC-B

**FEB 17 1942**Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Coordinator of Information,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Your letter of February 3, 1942, requesting two War Department cipher machines for service between your office and your branch in London, has been carefully considered.

The need for protecting the security of your communications is fully appreciated, and it is my desire to render whatever assistance may be possible. However, at the present time there is a critical shortage of these machines. Two manufacturers are engaged in their production, but due to their complex construction and the shortage of certain essential parts, the immediate needs of the War Department will not be met before the end of 1942.

If it will be of any assistance to you in solving your immediate problem, it is possible that arrangements can be made to have your most secret traffic between Washington and London handled through the War Department Message Center, provided that the volume of this traffic does not exceed ten messages of average length per day. It will be necessary for this traffic, both incoming and outgoing, to be paraphrased by our cryptographic personnel.

The War Department is most willing to furnish such additional technical assistance as you may desire in improving the security of your communications or in expediting their handling.

Sincerely yours,

*Henry L. Stimson*

Secretary of War

**SECRET**

May 9, 1962

M. MORANDUM

To: Thomas Darly

From: J. R. Murphy

Colonel Donovan would like to have notice go to all branch heads along the following lines:

"When people in the office desire to communicate with any representative of any other branch in a foreign field, they will not attempt to deal or communicate directly but will take the matter up with the head of the particular branch concerned."

This arises when somebody in F. I. S. has communicated directly with Bruce Hopper.

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
This arises when somebody in F. I. S. has communicated directly with Bruce Hopper.



2.

safe to rely so completely upon this one system which  
has already shown itself inadequate to our needs.

*With best regards  
Lester*







OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY AIR POUCH

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON

JULY 17, 1941

TO: Colonel Wm. J. DONOVAN

FROM: Fisher HOWE

Subject: Cipher Machines

This is a subject which has come up frequently and is the problem raised in many memoranda and conversations. This goes to you because we do not know exactly who is in charge of the cipher department in Washington and because it is a particularly significant problem now.

We have recently received some new machines from Sweden of the same type as we have had in the past. They show some improvement over the earlier models but seem to be still inadequate for the burden which we will put upon them. Actually the construction is fundamentally faulty; many of the most crucial parts are made from materials which cannot withstand the wear and tear they would normally have to take.

We have frequently urged that an entirely different cipher machine be used although we do not know what alternatives there are. Furthermore, with our increased traffic and the various degrees of security into which this traffic falls it would seem that we should do as does our Army and Navy, namely, use more than one system - have two or three alternate machines of a different type.

For the moment our cipher department is working smoothly, though already we have had to replace key parts in machines which are not over a month old, and there is every reason to believe that within a month or two we will again be in the most difficult situation of so frequent breakdowns that our service as a whole is curtailed. It does not seem

*Communication Line**SA/B  
SA/C  
SA/D*

July 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Buxton, Colonel Goodfellow,  
Major Bruce

From: William J. Donovan

I want a study made of the question of communications. I recognize that a difference of opinion exists as to the desirability of lines of communication for SO and SI. I wonder whether there should be a joint line of communication for both services. Let us find out what the fact is.

I asked Charlie Horn to look into this, and before doing so, talk to all of you about it. However, one thing must be done, whatever communications are established, they will be established through this office as a unit and not by separate units of this office. I know you will give the fullest cooperation to Mr. Horn in making this study.

W.J.D.

SECRET

develop a supply of operators for field and relay base work, a purchasing section, a small engineering development section, which in particular would maintain a continuous study of the efficiency of equipment supplied to operators and agents, together with a small accounting section in connection with purchase and installation of equipment.

Relay bases would be staffed also by representatives of the operations section at headquarters, who would have the discretionary authority to disseminate directly information received of an urgent character, to the appropriate Allied agencies, to the advanced bases of the United States armed services, and to other relay stations.

### III

The third echelon in this communications system should be the headquarters echelon.

Here, too, since the functions exercised would be in controlling measure functions of service, the organization should represent the Office of Strategic Services as a whole.

In this area would be located the Communications Officer of O.S.S., and his subsidiary staff as described above.

Incoming and outgoing messages to all branches of O.S.S. would be handled by a common message center, with facilities for coding and decoding, enciphering and deciphering addressed messages.

Appropriate distribution to the heads of the various branches of addressed information received, (except in the cases of urgent information which might be distributed directly from relay stations as



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**SECRET**

noted above), would be the responsibility of the headquarters message center, which would be under the jurisdiction of the Communications Officer of O.S.S.

## IV

The interception, and subsequent decoding or deciphering, of unaddressed messages, or of messages addressed to others, is sometimes considered a function of intelligence work. It is in no event properly a functional part of a communications system. Inasmuch as this type of intelligence work is now being done on a large scale by at least three other Government agencies, and since it will be possible, I believe, to make satisfactory arrangements with these agencies under which they will transmit to us any material that may be pertinent to the activities of the Office of Strategic Services, it is not recommended that any of the facilities of the communications system described above, be used for intercept work.

Robert Crosswell

Robert Crosswell/keh



**SECRET**

Functions of such relay stations will be to relay messages to and from:

(a) Receive and forward reports from field agents to headquarters, and orders from headquarters to field agents.

(b) Provide a system of intercommunication between relay stations and in operations and agents, together with a

(c) Afford communication with the advanced operational bases and field headquarters of the United States and Allied armed services.

(d) Transmit to headquarters reports of Allied intelligence groups when necessary and desirable.

Relay bases should be built strictly with reference to:

1. Requirements of field operations.
2. The comparative availability of other facilities, such as channels of communication that may be opened to us by our own Governmental agencies including the Army, Navy and the State Department, and of existing commercial facilities.

I believe it will be recognized that the functions of the relay bases, and the operations visualized in the second echelon of communications are purely functions of service. Therefore they may, and I believe should, be undertaken as an activity of the Office of Strategic Services as a whole, and to this end it is suggested that the Communications Section of O.S.S. be organized.

Such a section would be headed by a Communications Officer with whom would be associated a committee consisting of representatives of each of the branches of O.S.S. that might have need of communications facilities, in particular SA/B, SA/G and E, and A.

Under the Communications Officer would be an engineering section, which would build and operate stations; a training section, which would train personnel; and a distribution section, which might be distributed directly from relay stations as

**SECRET**

- (b) To superintend the equipping of field agents with suitable and adequate materiel.
- (c) To arrange for the establishment, after due consideration of the technical problems involved, of adequate relay stations by an engineering staff assigned to this work.
- (d) To station a headquarters representative at each relay station to act as liaison in reference to the communications problems of the field agents served by the particular relay station in question.

## II

The second echelon of the communications system can be described as the relay area.

Communications by wireless to and from agents in the field are necessarily limited by the range and power of the equipment carried by agents or operators.

Thus it will be necessary to establish, in connection with each field operation, where wireless communication is desired, an intermediate operational base in a neutral or friendly country. These bases must be set up at points where atmospheric conditions make it possible to establish receiving and transmitting stations at once sufficiently sensitive to maintain contact with agents in the field at the furthest limit of the range of the agents' own equipment, and at the same time sufficiently powerful to relay the messages to the United States and to other intermediate operational bases.

Other considerations being equal, probable sites for such relay stations will be in the vicinity of London, Lisbon, Gibraltar, Lagos, Cairo, Beirut, Basra, Calcutta, Chungking and Kweilin.

**SECRET**

A communications system for an intelligence service seems to divide itself naturally into three stages or echelons.

The first of these involves the transmission of intelligence from agents in the field to headquarters, together with the transmission of orders and requests for information from headquarters to the agents.

In this echelon the problems which present themselves involve the placement and displacement of transmitting sets, the allocation of sending and receiving frequencies, the scheduling of periods of communication and the location of operators, operator-agents and agents.

All of these questions must be decided primarily in terms of the task in hand.

Security of agents, furthermore, demands that the location and identity of stations and operators be known to as few people as possible.

For these reasons it seems to me impractical in this echelon to engage in any sort of joint operations, either with other branches of the O.S.S. or with other agencies.

Jurisdiction must lie exclusively with the headquarters from which the agent is sent out, and with these facts in mind, I recommend that a Communications Section be established in each branch of O.S.S. engaged in field operations.

The functions of such a Communications Section would be:

- (a) To devise appropriate channels of communication for every project in the field, in consultation with competent technical advisers.



**SECRET**

Mr. Cresswell

July 20, 1942

Major Bruce

Communications problem: survey and recommendations.

In accordance with Colonel Donovan's directive, I have made a study of the communications requirements of SA/H, from the point of view of the task at hand, the facilities available, and the most practical methods of procedure.

Although your instructions to me were limited to the study of the problem as it affected this branch only, I have been forced to the conclusion that the question is one that must be dealt with in reference to the Office of Strategic Services as a whole, and I therefore feel justified in discussing in this report the larger aspects of the problem, as well as those phases of it touching SA/H alone.

It goes without saying that the establishment of secure and rapid communications between headquarters and agents in the field, in both directions, is a matter of primary importance, without which this branch particularly cannot function effectively. Operations of an intelligence service without adequate and satisfactory communications are nothing more than motions in a vacuum.

It also goes without saying that the term "communications" embraces manifold and diverse methods, but for the purpose of present discussion the word will be used only in reference to communications by wireless telegraphy and allied methods of electrical transmission.



**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

**INTEROFFICE MEMO**

FROM: David Bruce  
TO: Colonel Donovan  
SUBJECT:


DATE July 20, 1942

I am attaching a report containing a survey and recommendations relative to the communications problem. This strikes me as being an excellent report. I think that, the more quickly we can get under way, the better.

*AB.*  
David Bruce

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myself after we had gone over it. We are ready  
to meet with you at your convenience.

  
C. W. Horn  
Technical Adviser

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: C. W. Horn  
TO: Colonel Donovan  
SUBJECT: Communication System for the OSS

DATE July 23, 1942

In accordance with your request Lt. Colonel Goodfellow, Major Bruce and myself held a conference on the question of a communication system for the Office of Strategic Services.

My report to you dated July 17 on this subject was read and discussed. The basic principles of such a system as outlined in the report were confirmed and agreed to by Colonel Goodfellow and Major Bruce. The point that was emphasized was that it depended upon an efficient and experienced man who would act as the communications officer. I believe that we can find such a man in the telegraph field. He undoubtedly will have a responsible position and it will be necessary for us to offer him some inducements. His experience must cover all phases of telegraph traffic and he must know the circuits and the operating managers of the various worldwide systems in order that we may benefit through his contacts.

You indicated that you would like to discuss this plan with Colonel Goodfellow, Major Bruce and



# GERMANS IN AFRICA : Military Plans.

1. In view of the constant increase of armoured and motorized forces as well as of air force in the British armies in the Near East, and especially in Lybia - HITLER has ordered Rommel to start immediately offensive operations.
2. The aim of this offensive is:
  - a - to weaken as much as possible the VIIIth British Army which, unless attacked now, might prove in the autumn a very serious danger to the Axis troops in North Africa.
  - b - to gain strategic success by capturing TOBRUK (at all cost) and the HALFAYA range.

It is not until these two important strategic regions are captured that convenient conditions will be created for a similar offensive against SUEZ.
3. According from information not from the OKW (source not given) operations against TOBRUK will consist of a powerful attack by the Axis armoured forces, synchronized with large-scale air-borne troop operations from CRETE.
4. Italo-German forces in LYBIA now amount to about 200.000 men, of which two fifths are German and three fifths are Italian.
5. Rommel's plans (which supplement the O.K.W. plan aiming only at the capture of TUBRUK and HALFAYA) are to break through the British army already at this stage of operations and to reach SUEZ.

ROMMEL disregards all orders of the O.K.W. and does that which he regards as indicated. His behaviour is secretly supported by HITLER and for this reason he cannot be called to account.

28 May 1942

Communication 7344  
 10.10.42  
 \* Communication 7344  
 10.10.42  
 June 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Hugh R. Wilson  
 FROM: Allen W. Dulles

CONFIDENTIAL

Our Polish friends handed me today a memorandum they have just received from London entitled: "Germans in Africa : Military Plans". This was dated May 28, 1942, which was the date the information was forwarded from London. They pointed to this as an example of the importance of working out quicker means of communicating information available in London. This memorandum foretells with reasonable accuracy, as of a month ago, German plans for their North African offense. Today the information has little value, and they showed it to me only as an example of what we might be missing by the delay in transmission.

I have discussed this whole matter in some detail with David Bruce and I realize that everything possible is being done. However, this memorandum might furnish David further ammunition in his negotiations.

*W. A. D.*

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 8859

Date Rec'd SA

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Asst Dir (W) 1108		6/27	6/30	WJW	
2. Bance	1218				
3. WJW				WJW	
4. Miller					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.  
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.



Date 6/30/42

TO Mr. Bruce

Remarks :

You may want to keep this in connection  
with your memo to the Colonel re couriers.

C.C.

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scale would now be timely and satisfactory.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
COORDINATOR OF DEFENSE

As an instance of the importance of speeding mail transmission, I might cite the fact that a large volume of secret communications are almost always available for passage between London and Washington. The foreign secret service will not provide us with such material unless they can be assured that it will be forwarded through the most secret channels. The only method of doing so at the present time is to send this material in the American Embassy pouches from London. These pouches are so filled as a general rule with Embassy mail that very little space, and often none, is available for other messages. The result is that data which would often be of great interest to the American military and naval establishments never arrives here in time for those establishments to gather the full benefit which they would have derived from them had their transmission been more speedy.

David Bruce

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  
CONFIDENTIAL

Our written communications, whenever secret in nature, are for the most part carried in State Department pouches. The use of secret inks in letters sent by ordinary mail is only practicable on rare occasions. Since the State Department pouches are, in many instances, overloaded, it often happens that we are unable to forward to various parts of the world written communications which it is important should arrive here or elsewhere as quickly as possible. A possible solution to this problem would appear to be the setting up for the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a pouch system of its own. This would be particularly easy of accomplishment for service to those parts of the world which are covered by the Army Ferry Command. In the case of mail flowing to and fro between Washington and London, the only permission required for such an operation would be that of the United States and British governments. Where, however, passage over the territory of other governments is involved, it would be necessary to have the pouches under State Department seal and probably have them carried by couriers designated by that department.

You will recall that, at the end of the last war, the Army had the so-called "greyhound" courier service in operation. The personnel consisted of Army officers. I believe that the revival of such a system on a small





UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 30, 1942

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN:

In order that the OSS may efficiently carry out the duties assigned to it by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would seem imperative that it have a widespread system of communications at its disposition.

In order for such communications to be properly effective, they must be (1) secret, (2) speedy, (3) comprehensive.

OSS has at the present time its own codes and ciphers. The bulk of its messages, other than those sent by mail, are transmitted through channels available to the State Department. This results from our standpoint in very slow transmission, since not only are our messages often delayed until the State Department officials have fully scrutinized them, but they are subject to the higher priorities of the State Department's own messages.

The whole question, however, of radio, cable and telegraph communications is one which will be the subject of a later memorandum.

AMERICAN STAFFCANTEEN AND ALCOHOL FACILITIES, CLUBS, ETC.

1. Canteen: In the past the Embassy personnel have been allowed the facility of the canteen shipments which have come over periodically and for which orders are placed in advance. It is questionable whether this service will continue. Perhaps the Army will take over the management of it but until the arrangements are completed it will not be known whether our office staff will be permitted to use the facility.

Army officers are permitted the use of the post exchange for cigarettes and supplies but this source is not open to civilians.

2. Alcoholic beverages: The position on obtaining alcoholic beverages is difficult in the extreme. There are two sources:

- (a) Open market: One can occasionally purchase from established wine merchants small quantities of Scotch, Irish, Pin and some wines. This must be entirely a personal arrangement between individual and wine merchant.
- (b) Out of bond: Official diplomatic personnel are allowed to purchase liquor out of bond, tax free. This, however, is limited entirely to those diplomatic officials registered with the Foreign Office and the members of the O.S.S. Mission are not included with the single exception of the Head of the Mission. We are trying to arrange that members of this mission be put on this list, but until this is done the out of bond source of beverage is not available except perhaps through the good offices of a friend who may be on that list.

3. CLUBS: With a few exceptions arrangements can usually be made for officers to be members of any of the men's Clubs. However, honorary memberships are easily obtained for the following:

American Club; Piccadilly: Luncheon Club and good American cooked food.

R.A.C. (Royal Automobile Club); Pall Mall: Very large, Hotel like, but with excellent facilities - restaurant, bar, swimming pool, squash courts.

FH

23/7/42

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5. Letters of authorization and travel orders should be left temporarily with Mr. Howe, so that all arrangements for paying salary, travel expenses and per diems can be commenced immediately.

6. Clothing Coupons: Basic ration books which will be ordered for you will contain clothes coupons. As far as possible clothing purchases should be limited to the extent of rationed coupons but supplementary coupons can be obtained if necessary by written memorandum to Mr. Howe's office - such memorandum to itemize clothes needed.

FH

23/7/42



NOTICE TO AMERICAN STATENEW ARRIVALS

1. All Americans with our Office fall into one of two categories: Those formally attached to the London Office, and visitors.
2. Those formally attached to our London Office must take the following steps for registration:

- (a) Obtain three passport photographs.  
Recommended photographers -

Jerome, Ltd.,                      Selfridge, Ltd.,  
43, Oxford Street,    or    Oxford Street,  
W.1.                                  W.1.

- (b) Submit two photographs to Mr. Howe's office and fill in National Registration and Certificate of Registration Forms.
- (c) The third photograph is for the O.S.S. Office pass.

The Embassy will then automatically obtain Identity Cards, Alien Registration and Food and Clothing Coupon books.

3. Visitors (those not formally attached to London Office) must take the following steps at the earliest moment after arrival:

- (a) Obtain three passport photographs (See 2a).
- (b) Call at Aliens Registration Branch, Piccadilly Place, with photographs, and receive Aliens Registration Card.
- (c) Call at local Food Office (viz., in this neighbourhood, Caxton Hall, Caxton Street, Westminster, S.W.1.) and there receive Identity Cards and Food and Clothing Ration books.
- (d) Submit Aliens Registration Card to Mr. Howe's office in order that it may be sent to the Foreign Office for special certification. These calls must be made in person.

4. All new arrivals, whether attached to our office or visitors should also do the following:

- (a) Make an appointment and call to have an Embassy pass photograph taken with:

Madame Yevonde,  
26, Berkeley Square, W.1.  
Mayfair 5177.

- (b) Leave with Mr. Howe's office home or hotel address and telephone number, and subsequently please register all changes in address promptly. Notification of week-end addresses should also be given.

NOTICE TO AMERICAN STAFFNEW ARRIVALS

1. All Americans with our Office fall into one of two categories: Those formally attached to the London Office, and visitors.

2. Those formally attached to our London Office must take the following steps for registration:

- (a) Obtain three passport photographs.  
Recommended photographers -  
Jerome, Ltd.,                      Selfridge, Ltd.,  
43, Oxford Street,      or      Oxford Street,  
W.1.                                      W.1.
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Madame Yevonde,  
28, Berkeley Square, W.1.  
Mayfair 5177.

- (b) Leave with Mr. Howe's office home or hotel address and telephone number, and subsequently please register all changes in address promptly. Notification of week-end addresses should also be given.

### POUCH PROCEDURE

The following procedure should be closely adhered to with all Pouch Mail. During the summer when there is a frequent air service, pouches are going two or three times a week and no notice will be given. Further, it is important that pouch mail be prepared in the normal course of work and not specially to catch a specific pouch departure. All pouch mail will be assumed to be AIR POUCH unless it is designated that it should await a Sea Pouch.

1. An original and two copies should be made of all letters, memoranda and typed enclosures. One copy to be put in the appropriate office file, the other for the chronological pouch file which will be brought to Mr. Howe's office with the original.
2. Where original documents are forwarded the correct title and date of document should be marked at the foot of the covering letter.
3. Envelopes: An addressed envelope should accompany all pouch material, but it should be left unsealed. It will be appropriately stamped and sealed to comply with Washington's instructions in Mr. Howe's office, and where necessary inserted in a covering envelope.
4. Envelope markings: Pouch mail of secret classification should be marked on the outside, "Secret", "By Hand", "Air Pouch", "Official Business", as per attached example.
- All pouch mail should be addressed to the Washington Office, not to other branch offices in the United States. This is to ensure delivery by hand from the State Department where it is received to the office in Washington from whence it will be forwarded if necessary by courier.
5. Owing to the very severe weight limitations all air pouch material is to be typed on the thinnest paper, and where practicable enclosures on heavy paper should be re-copied on to thin paper.



### CABLE SECURITY

The following guidance is important for preserving the security of our cipher.

1. All drafts, notes, stenographers notes and paraphrases are of security value equal to the cable itself and should be guarded carefully.
2. No cables, paraphrases or notes should be left lying on desks when there is nobody about. Particularly at lunch time cables should be locked up.
3. It is important for cipher security, but also for the efficient filing and care of the cables that no cables be removed from the filing books. This should be a cardinal principle.
4. All drafts and notes must be attached to the final copy going out. These will be destroyed in the cipher room.
5. At no time should cables be read over the telephone, or for that matter the substance of a cable given in anything more than the roughest outline.
6. If the safe is locked and there is no one around to accept cables or other secret documents for locking up it is urged that they be given to the cipher room for safe keeping. Should there be no one in the cipher room at the time cables can be left in the slot and the cipher boys will put them in the safe when they come in.
7. It is important when using the State Department channel that Embassy regulations be carried out. These regulations prescribe that only American citizens can type and carry telegrams in their secret codes.
8. See special instructions on paraphrasing.

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Safe Combinations: should never be written down. Please ask for instruction on safe combinations when access to safes has been entrusted to you.

CABLE PARAPHRASE

It is absolutely essential for security that a most careful check be kept on all paraphrases made from our cables and that these be kept to the barest minimum. It is not a question of the information contained in any one cable, but the security of our cipher system which is involved, and therefore any one message is as secret as the most secret. All messages carried by our cipher system are equally secret.

Following general principles:

1. No direct copies should ever be made of cables.
2. It is better to take notes on a cable than to make anything approaching a paraphrase.
3. Paraphrases should be made only when authorized. For the present authorization will be by Mr. Howe. When a cable room is set up in the new building only they will make paraphrases.
4. All paraphrases should be carefully checked when made by other than one thoroughly tried at the task. This is to ensure that the sense is not distorted and also that the text has been properly changed.
5. In all cases the recipients of a paraphrase must be made aware that it is a cable paraphrase and that it must be so guarded.
6. All paraphrases should be stamped "secret".
7. The number of paraphrases made and their distribution should be noted at the foot of the original cable.

## CABLES

1. All cables are divided into two categories:
  - (a) Policy Cables: Cables dealing with over-all office or branch policy which have no bearing on the specific operations of the branch such as are the subject of the regular cables. Such cables are between branchheads only or between head of the Mission and Colonel Donovan. They are composed without the branch designation, i.e., SOSOP, SASAC - and simply bear the name of the branch head addressee and branch head sender.
  - (b) Regular Cables: Straight operational cables which are the bulk of our communication. These cables simply have the branch indication at the top and no names are used since the subject emanates not from an individual but from the branch itself.
2. It is important that reference cable numbers be included at all times. This is especially important if it is a direct answer to a cable, but also when it is simply the same subject as in another cable.
3. Cables should at all times be as brief as possible, not only for the saving thereon, but because in most cases it makes for greater clarity.
4. Cables should be as impersonal as possible; names of sender and addressee should not be included except where they have specific bearing on the material in the cable; use of the first person singular should be discouraged. In other words, cables should emanate not from an individual but rather from the office itself.
5. The distribution of the cable desired by the Composer should be listed in lower left-hand corner specifying who is responsible for action and who should see for information.
6. Specimens of outgoing cables are attached hereto.



## OUTGOING CABLE

Paraphrase

File ADMAD

Serial

Security

ADMAD

Date

Your 17033

1. CARLTON arrived and.....
2. Have discussed with him.....

(Initials of sender and typist)

Distribution:

Action:

Information:

**NOTE:**

Capitalize all proper names within the matter of the cable.  
 Always give reference cable numbers.  
 Make cable impersonal - emanating from the office not the  
 individual.

**OUTGOING CABLE**

Paraphrase

File POLICY

AMSTAN

Sender (

Security

**POLICY**

**To A/204**

**From 150**

**Our 21125.**

1. ....
2. ....

**(Initials of sender and typist)**

**Distribution:**

**Action:**

**Information:**

**NOTE:**

Policy cables are to be sent only from and to Bureau.

Approved





OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
 LONDON

July 23, 1941

Dear Jimmy,

I am enclosing here some of the office instructions that we have compiled, which might be of interest to you, or perhaps you will want to pass them on to others whom you think would be interested in knowing some of the details of our office and methods.

Mr. Phillips and David Williamson arrived safely and are working in most happily. Regrettably we are so overcrowded in the Embassy here that we cannot give them adequate office space and so they are adopting the Colonel's method of keeping Headquarters in Claridges - (everyone in Claridges wants to know where that Jimmy Murphy is!). MacLeish, Warburg and Brady are likewise here and going strong and they too are headquartered at Claridges. I am hoping that when Warburg gets through some of his preliminary jobs we will be able to get started on a friendly separation of the combined offices here.

Our telephone conversation the other day was for us most satisfactory and I hope it was for you. We do not want to be impatient in getting answers on some of the problems but on many of them it is of vital importance that we have some direction before we move into the new building. Incidentally, our hope is to start moving in somewhere round the first week in August. It will then take a couple of weeks to finish off the moving. There is some question being raised about the occupancy of our space here in the Embassy but Mr. Phillips is handling the matter with the Ambassador.

Did I ever thank you for the tobacco? It was delicious, most welcome and thoughtful of you.

Always with best regards,

Frank

James Murphy, Esq.,  
 Office of Strategic Services,  
 25th & E Sts.,  
 Washington, D.C.



O  
P  
Y

July 29 1942

FROM LONDON

No. 4237

We are informed by Phillips that you have authorized communications of an official nature for him to be passed on by the pouch to him without being examined provided Colonel Donovan has written his initials on them. Phillips would like to know if this same procedure could be followed inversely, i.e. for communications for the Colonel from him. We suggest that this be permitted.

WISANT.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL

DATE: JULY 31 1942

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN

SUBJECT: CABLE NO. 4237, JULY 29th, FROM WINANT

With reference to the attached cable, this matter originated in a conversation had with John Wilson on his return from England. I this morning had a meeting with Mr. Shaw in an endeavor to establish procedure to meet our needs. He is cabling to Winant to suggest that Phillips be granted practically the same courtesies which have been accorded us here, namely, that any letters which are initialed by Phillips as not containing matter which would affect U.S. foreign or political policy would be accepted for transmission in the pouch without having to be read by Winant. It is with the understanding, however, that Mr. Winant will be kept advised by Mr. Phillips whenever such communications concern U.S. foreign or political policy. Mr. Shaw is sending a cable to England to this effect today and will let me have a copy for our records.

*W.A.K.*  
W.A.K.

cc: Mr. John D. Wilson

- 3 -

**CONFIDENTIAL**

improve the service on the existing cable.

Another illustration of the close cooperation between the Army, Navy, State Department and OSS communication centers, is that we have created an informal committee consisting of General Stoner (Army), Captain Redman (Navy), Mr. Salmon (State Department) and myself (OSS), for the purpose of ironing out any difficulties which we may encounter in the communications requirements of the respective organizations and also for making use of any improved methods which will increase the efficiency of our communications. The four members of this informal committee are all experienced communications men and each of them has a wide acquaintance in the communications industry. It is therefore possible for this group to call upon all of the communications executives and engineers in this country, and in many cases in foreign countries, for information and help because of this personal contact. This group working together can undertake to solve any of the communications problems which confront the U. S. Government and by making use of each others facilities will counteract departmental jealousies in the interest of fighting the One war in which we are engaged.

*C. W. Horn*  
C. W. Horn  
Technical Advisor



- 2 -

**CONFIDENTIAL**

it has been used on land lines by the Western Union Company and officers of that company, with whom I am well acquainted, have expressed willingness to install this device on the cables provided it would be used by a sufficient number of departments. The advantages to be gained by using this system are the entire elimination of delays, each office being immediately in touch with its corresponding office across the Atlantic; increased speed of operation, and what is probably also important is that it costs no more as we would still be paying on the same word basis as heretofore. A very important advantage is that the signals going eastward would be divided over three existing cables in such a manner that if the enemy is tapping these cables it cannot obtain the messages unless they tap three cables simultaneously, have an exact copy of the machinery required and operate in synchronism with such machinery, all of which is extremely difficult. Therefore security is greatly increased. Mr. Salmon of the State Department stated that he would go along and would make a favorable recommendation to Mr. Shaw.

I also contacted Captain Joseph Redman, Director of Naval Communications, who stated that he would go along. General Frank E. Stoner of the Army Signal Corps was quite enthusiastic over the plan. Therefore we have a unanimous desire for this improved service. It will take a couple of months to install the equipment and in the meanwhile we jointly agreed to see what we could do to

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
COORDINATOR OF COMMUNICATIONS

INTEROFFICE MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: O. W. Horn  
TO: Colonel Donovan  
SUBJECT: OSS Communications

DATE August 16, 1942

I take pleasure in reporting that I am receiving excellent cooperation from the Director of Naval Communications, the Signal Corps of the Army and the Communications Branch of the State Department. This can be illustrated by mentioning the result of some recent actions.

We have received a complaint from our London office specifying delays and the difficulties of handling communications over the State Department cable which is connected also to the Army, Navy and OSS offices in London and Washington. I visited the State Department and conferred with the Honorable G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, and also Mr. David H. Salmon, Chief, Division of Communications and Records. I outlined a method by which it would be possible for each one of the government departments to have a direct and private circuit between their Washington offices and their respective London offices, which plan provides for independent operation without any delays because of the use of the cable by other departments, as is now the case. This calls for the adaptation of a system known as the "varioplex" to the cables and which has been tested and found efficient. This is not a new device as

Colonel Donovan

- 3 -

August 10, 1942

extent difficulties we are now experiencing. When the varioplax is installed we will have immediate direct communications at any moment we want it and there will be no delays at all.

I might state that in this connection I have been able also to protect OWI and provide for their service into London. I have advised OWI that I am sending the coding machine which has just arrived in London over to them. Similarly, I am turning over a coding machine to them in Washington within the next few days. I am giving them 10 of the hand machines which they have requested. It is probable that we will have to give them one additional coding machine sometime in the near future. They have been after me repeatedly about these machines. I have been able to do this without in any way sacrificing our own interests.

I am advising Mr. Fisher Howe in London about the new setup on cables as soon as everything has been made definite. For your information.

  
C. W. Horn



Colonel Donovan

- 2 -

August 28, 1942

mental communications committee which consists of General Stoner of the U. S. Army Signal Corps, Captain Redman, Director of Naval Communications, Mr. Salmon, head of State Department communications, and myself. We had the vice-president of the Western Union Telegraph and Cable Company present and we all agreed that the introduction of the varioplex machines on the cables would solve our problem and greatly improve service. These departments all gave their tentative agreement to go ahead and Western Union will proceed with the manufacture and installation of the apparatus. It will take some four to six months with excellent priorities to have this system installed. The advantage of the system is that each of the departments will have the equivalent of a private line between their Washington and London offices with no interruptions for twenty-four hours a day, and we will obtain this without any increase in rates - paying for it on the present word rate basis - even though this would cost Western Union \$115,000 to install.

In the interim, while the varioplex system is being installed, we need considerable improvement and we have worked out a plan which has been tentatively approved whereby we will get the use of additional facilities now used by British Admiralty, if British Admiralty will agree, so that we will overcome to some

(052) *7/21*  
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
 COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: C. W. Horn ✓  
 TO: Colonel Donovan  
 SUBJECT: Cables

DATE August 20, 1942

A memo signed by William A. Kimbel, dated August 13, and addressed to you was turned over to me by Jimmy Murphy. This memo was in connection with having a meeting of all the people who were concerned with the handling of our cables and also for the purpose of trying to find some method of improving service. I held that meeting at which were present Mr. Fay of R & A, Miss Walton of the Message Center and Mr. Hayes head of the cable room for SA. Mr. Lincoln was not in town. We discussed the various problems and it was evident that we need a new method or system for obtaining the messages which arrive at the Message Center in the State Department and expediting their delivery to OSS. I have discussed this matter with Mr. Salmon of the State Department and we are getting into it so as to short-circuit the delay.

The delays on the State Department cable to London are due to the fact that four of us are sharing the cable and we are required to telephone the State Department Message Center here in Washington, and the same thing is true in London, and we frequently must wait considerable periods because the cable is in use by some other department. Also there is a great deal of wasted time in switching, failure to answer the telephone promptly, etc. This condition led to a meeting of the "unofficial" govern-

Communications

X I I C

September 2, 1961

Major General George V. Strong,  
Military Intelligence Division, G-2,  
War Department,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Strong:

I am sending you the memorandum on communications  
which I would like to have taken up for approval at the  
J. I. C. meeting tomorrow.

Thanking you for your many courtesies, I am,

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director



-3-

normal army communication channels will be too overtaxed to take on this additional problem. Furthermore, an operator is required who is specially trained for this type of work.

In the event that communications in the field break down, the S. O. agents and bands can communicate with the home S. O. station in England and contact with the army will thus be preserved.

The necessity of immediate action being taken on the communications problems of the London office is obvious. We must start work on acquiring adequate sending and receiving facilities in England and on the training of operators and staff officers. We must be ready to operate with the army when the time comes. It should be borne in mind that Madagascar was largely an S. O. show and we can render the same kind of military service on the continent. Our American high command must be schooled to regard us as an essential arm of the service, just as the British high command regard their S. O.E. Military estimates and appreciations must take into account S. O. and battle orders must contain a paragraph devoted to the S.O.

-2-

military effort. Indeed, it is necessary that we be regarded as an arm of the service similar to infantry or artillery, with a specific military mission to perform.

You have had placed before you the proposal to train 35 teams who will be dropped behind enemy lines to organize the local patriots and to carry out the orders of the army field commanders to destroy enemy communications, supply lines and to perform such other missions as may be directed. The British are already training a similar number of teams to work behind their sector.

In order that all S. O. activities may be properly carried out, properly trained S. O. officers will have to be assigned to Division, Corps and Army Commanders, as well as at G.H.Q. These men will advise the various commanders and carry out their orders in the same way as, for example, an artillery liaison officer would advise and carry out the missions assigned by the infantry commander to whom he might be assigned.

In addition, such S. O. staff officers will have to have their own radio equipment and operators at the various C. P.'s and headquarters. It is obvious that

*File  
Communications  
London*

*London Office (201)  
x 8. 6  
August 30, 1942  
x H. H. H.*

MEMORANDUM

For: Colonel Donovan  
From: Major R. P. Heppner

Yesterday in discussing London communications problems, I discovered that various people concerned were not fully acquainted with the operational plans now being formulated in London. I learned that there is an impression that when actual military operations commence, G-2 will step in and our functions will practically cease. While this may be partially true in the case of purely SI functions, nothing, as you well know, could be farther from the truth in the case of the operational side of our office.

In London, by means of joint American-British Planning Committees we are now working out the plans for the operations which we will carry out when the organized military effort commences. Such operations, while irregular in nature, will be closely coordinated with the main



-3-

was Vice President in charge of Operations of  
the Columbia Broadcasting Company.

With kind personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

GEB 78

U. Edward Norton

-2-

of their stations. Recent exchange of cables lead us to believe that we have already secured the consent of the British in England for the establishment of an independent field contact station. The location and site have not been decided. It is possible we can use their existing facilities independently. We do not, of course, like to be subject to any supervision in the matter of our communications. This point also, we think, is now acceptable to them.

Captain Huot is going in advance of clearance on this side. We hope to wire you shortly that this has been obtained. There is nothing official you can do about this until you receive this clearance after which I suggest that you, Colonel Guenther, Whitney Shephardson and Captain Huot call on General Eisenhower and request his formal approval of the establishment of a field contact station somewhere in Great Britain to be used for two way communication with agents now or hereafter placed in the field. This communication system, when established, will serve jointly SI and SO.

I am particularly anxious that it should be understood that Captain Huot is arriving solely to acquaint you and your associates with this situation so that there will be no undue delay when we can wire you to proceed.

We are, of course, anxious in view of pending situations to get this thing arranged at the earliest possible date but I do not wish to give the appearance here of acting abroad without clearance at home.

Captain Huot can tell you and Colonel Guenther and Whitney Shephardson more in detail about this situation. He is acting as Major Lowman's representative and with the approval of this office.

I enclose a copy of an Executive Order just issued in this office.

Major Lowman prior to entering the service and assuming his responsibility with us

September 27, 1942

The Honorable William Phillips  
Office of Strategic Services  
American Embassy  
London, England

Dear Mr. Phillips:

This will introduce Captain Louis Huot, Captain in our Communications Branch and former European representative of Press Wireles. He is, therefore, quite familiar with radio and its operation.

The present situation concerning the radio branch which we have just set up in OSS, under the direction of Major L.W. Lowman, is as follows:

The whole matter of communications for OSS is still in the hands of the Joint Intelligence Committee and has not yet gone for final approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Everything has been cleared, however, with the Joint Intelligence Committee except a detail concerning the operation and administration of our reception stations: one on Long Island and the other in North Hollywood. The general outline of the Communications Branch has, however, been approved; namely:

1. That we are to have agents with portable sets in the field, and,
2. That we are to have field contact stations wherever necessary; provided:
  - A. That we obtain the consent of the Theater Commander (in case of Europe, General Eisenhower)
  - B. The establishment of such a station in England will require negotiation and the approval of the British

We, as you know, have had cables from the British offering the facilities of one



station, if established, will serve both  
SI and SO.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours

G. Edward Muxton

Assistant Director

GEB FS

cc to: Colonel Donovan

September 24, 1942

The Honorable William Phillips  
Office of Strategic Services  
The Embassy  
London, England.

Dear Mr. Phillips:

This afternoon the Joint Intelligence Committee completed its discussion of the communications system for the Office of Strategic Services and has now approved that such a system be established where it will not duplicate existing Army, Navy and commercial facilities.

They recognize the right of our agents to carry portable sets and communicate with stations just outside of enemy occupied countries which we will have to establish since there are none at present controlled by the American Armed Forces.

My previous letter outlined this whole situation at some length, particularly the matter of securing General Eisenhower's approval for establishing a field contact station in Great Britain for contact with agents within its range. I asked General Strong if it was now proper to ask you to approach General Eisenhower on the matter of this field contact station. General Strong said it was all right.

The Joint Intelligence Committee is sending its recommendation forward at once to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it is reasonable to assume that they will approve the action of their Committee.

As I said before, I think it will be helpful to take Colonel Guenther and Whitney Shepardson with you since this field contact

[illegible]

The cost of our visits to the island is far less, it costs us nothing to visit here for years.

There is little else to report for the moment, except that we have not met any difficulty in our attempt to clear up our financial position in relation to the various projects we have discussed this afternoon.

Louis Mot,  
Capt., U. S. Army

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/09 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100110006-6



E.O. 11652

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECRET

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
LONDONSECRET  
ATTENTION

7th, October 1943.

To: Major L. A. Lowman  
Office of Strategic Services  
" " Building  
Washington, D. C.

From: Captain Louis Mount

On arriving in London, Lieutenant Drayson and I called immediately on Mr. Phillips, Colonel Gruenther and Mr. Sheperdson. The two letters I brought over from Colonel Duxton were delivered to Mr. Phillips.

The following day we called on Colonel M'Kenzie, from whom we learned that there remained considerable differences between his conception of our underground and our own. From him it further became evident that the misunderstanding was on our side: The British reports to us had been misinterpreted. The principle of the E.T.O. possessing its own independent communications system in the British Isles was not yet accepted in the Colonels mind. You will find, inclosed, a memorandum prepared for Mr. Phillips after this first conversation with Colonel M'Kenzie.

Since then the letter of introduction with which you provided me - the letter addressed to Lt. Com. Harry C. Butcher - has been presented. The Commander arranged for us to see General L. M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff at the A. F. headquarters, Lt. Col. W. W. Hayes, of the Signals Office, and General J. V. Matejka, Chief Signals Officer at this headquarters. (General Clark, whom I did not see, is another Deputy Chief of Staff and shares an office with General Gruenther).

These officers proved to have some knowledge of our work and of our plans, and give every indication of wishing to assist us. Through them we were referred to Col. R. P. Lyman, Chief Signals Officer of the E.T.O., with whom we discussed at length the possibility of obtaining the frequencies we require.

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

**SECRET**

TO: Commander Vanderbilt

DATE: October 24, 1942

FROM: Major Lowman

SUBJECT:

The whole question of our situation in London requires, I think, immediate executive consideration. I have asked Captain Huod to send me reports on progress made to establish an independent field station in England. The attached copy of his first report gives an idea of the progress that has been made.

Under date of October 16th I sent you a copy of my report to Colonel Donovan, advising him what steps had been taken regarding the official establishment here of a Communications Branch. On this you will see that General Stoner promised an early decision on the matter. Telephone calls of mine during the past week, before I left for California, did not result in my contacting him. Whether difficulties we are having as a result of the confused orders having to do with the safety of our codes and our machines has affected it, I don't know. On the other hand, after having received a clearance from General Stoner's office, Chief of the Signal Corps, and then to find that other orders have resulted in a confusing changeover to the use of Army facilities, may have some bearing on the matter.

*WLB*

Attachment

**SECRET**

*055*  
*Communications London*  
**SECRET**  
*London*

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan

October 27, 1942

From: William H. Vanderbilt

I attach copy of a memo received from Major Lowman together with copy of a report from Captain Huot in London regarding our Communications set-up.

These would seem to indicate that while matters are progressing satisfactorily in London the plans for our own Communications system and station may be held up if we do not receive early approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Please note the first paragraph on second page of Captain Huot's report.

*W.H.V.*  
W. H. V.

**SECRET**



*Communications*  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

**INTEROFFICE MEMO**

**TO:** Colonel William J. Donovan  
**FROM:** Lt. J. H. Rosenbaum, Priorities Officer. *JHR*  
**SUBJECT:** Purchase of Equipment for Chinese.

**DATE:** September 25, 1945

1. The matter of purchasing communications equipment for the Chinese has come up.
2. Much equipment is available from private interests such as unlicensed equipment, equipment belonging to persons entering the armed forces, etc.
3. Major Lowman and Mr. Horton of the Office of Strategic Services are working with me on the securing of certain Western Electric Equipment, which they are taking up with you direct.
4. Will you kindly indicate your approval or disapproval of efforts to secure equipment for the Chinese from the private sources listed above.
5. The purchase of such equipment will require arrangements with Lend-Lease Administration for the advance of funds to the Office of Strategic Services for disbursement for these purposes.

Jhr/emw

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE

(To be destroyed)

I saw Col. Groome of G-2 today, who said that, off the record, he thought Col. Clark had been responsible for a great deal of this as a result of a personal feud with Col. Frombach.

Col. Groome also said that he thought it was too bad that they were not able to get our intercepts any longer in that they have been of considerable value.

Page 5.

We also might bring up the disposition of the material now being gathered by our monitoring on the West Coast since for the time being we have stopped monitoring at Bellmore. Also, some consideration of my proposal that the present wording of the plan for monitoring be changed, to permit the use of the stations for specific intercept or specific monitoring purposes to be approved by both the head of the Signal Corps and the head of Naval Communications, providing there wasn't any duplication; that it served constructive ends and that the information contained in the message traffic be turned over to whatever sources they agreed upon.

*over*



Page 4.

SECRET

was duplication, it could always be stopped or changed to another field that might be of direct value.

He then wanted to know what Captain Holden, Chief of Naval Communications, thought about it, and I told him he thought he would have to follow whatever ruling was set down by the J.I.C. to the letter, but he too wanted to avoid duplication by other agencies and particularly wanted to avoid the use of manpower that was so badly needed by the Army and Navy.

General Stoner then suggested that we set up a committee, consisting of himself, Captain Holden and me, to consider the man-porting problem, although he saw no point in taking any steps at the moment until the J.I.C. had formally acted.

I then asked when they expected to put their operators in our plants since the Navy had already moved into Bellmore, Long Island. He said this would have to be held up until formal action had been taken.

It was your feeling this morning that the entire matter might be taken care of through mutual understanding and that perhaps it would not be necessary to wait for formal action by the J.I.C.; that General Strong might withdraw his report. This might be explored with General Stoner at the Wednesday luncheon.

**SECRET**

Page 3.

The G.S.C. will not use its radio stations at  
Bellmore, Long Island and North Hollywood,  
California, for general intercept or monitoring  
purposes.

These stations will be used by G.S.C. for  
monitoring its own radio stations only and  
for establishing emergency contact with its  
base stations when Army and Navy communications  
are not available for this purpose.

I utilized General Stoner that, because these stations  
have been set-up for long range intercept and because we have  
been able to turn up information of value in specific sections  
of the countries we ourselves were working in, we should be  
able to continue. I also brought out the point that it was  
impossible to keep good radio operators sitting around until  
we had emergency work to do with our own base stations.

General Stoner said they would be able to give us any  
information they were able to gather by monitoring; that he  
wanted to avoid duplication but did see the practicalness of  
our argument. I then suggested that we might turn over any  
information we obtained directly to them and, if we found there

Page 2.

the meeting, and asked if delivery could be made, and Major Cook said he thought they could furnish the four machines we need, shortly after a promised delivery date of October 15th.

General Stonor then said he had been to see Col. Rutherford and he was surprised to find we were using British subjects on the machines. He explained that at no time had this been done, although we had used British mechanics for minor repairs on the machines themselves, the same way you might have a typewriter repaired.

General Stonor seemed satisfied with their explanations and turned to Major Cook and asked him if he knew of any softness in our codes. Major Cook said he did not and that since the Coast Guard had made them up under Comdr. Jones, they were just as secure as their own. General Stonor agreed that this was undoubtedly true and suggested that a meeting be held between Comdr. Jones and Major Cook to investigate further, though he did not anticipate any difficulties. I asked that Lt. Delafield be in on this meeting which is set for Tuesday of this week.

The second part of our discussion was on the question of our operations, as outlined in the following paragraph from the memorandum prepared for the J.I.C. to establish a communications branch for the O.S.S.:



*File*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

FROM: Major Lowman

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: CODES

DATE: October 6, 1942

On Saturday, October 3rd, Comdr. Jones of the Coast Guard, Lt. Simpson, L. Delafield and I met with General Stonor, Chief of the Signal Corps.

The first half of the discussion had to do with the question of: a. our code machines; b. possible softness of our codes.

General Stonor stated that General Clark had objected to our using the Hagelin machine at Cairo. We immediately explained that we had no such machines there and General Stonor said he would clear up the misunderstanding with General Clark. Then there was a general discussion on the Hagelin machines and its weaknesses, and Lt. Delafield produced a letter that you had written back in January of this year to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, at the instigation of Comdr. Jones, asking that we be furnished with Army machines. This letter was answered and delivery promised towards the end of 1942. General Stonor turned to Major Cook, who was his only representative at

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO:

DATE: 10/10/67

FROM:

SUBJECT:

*ma*

**SECRET**

- 3 -

As to the Dragon Project itself, I explained to Mr. Grosswell of SI in the beginning that to undertake the installation of this equipment in China would be a colossal job requiring more manpower than we could set our hands on for some time. He explained to me that Mr. Norton would undertake this operation with engineers who would have already been selected. As far as I can gather, this consists of one engineer who is ~~now~~ <sup>now</sup> located at the T. A. plant, working on getting the order complete as quickly as possible. It would seem that no such operation could be completed without active cooperation of the Chinese Government and the use of some of their own engineers and their own workmen to make the installation and operate the equipment once it is installed. Such an operation might be satisfactorily supervised by Mr. Norton and the engineer, but I would like to discuss with you the existing restrictions and difficulties that immediately present themselves at this stage.

*enc*

cc: Capt. Toring



SECRET

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provided, of course, the cost will not be deducted from the Communications Budget and that Capt. Doering will be able to work out an arrangement whereby the material could be obtained from Lend Lease funds. Since the equipment will also involve heavy priorities, we also wish to ensure it will not affect our own efforts to obtain equipment requiring priorities.

As given the information by Mr. Lusey and then by Lt. Resorbaum that a great portion of the equipment could be obtained from China and Japan. However, further investigation has revealed that the list of the parts were not only needed but also obsolete and a fairly high priority would be needed to obtain the same from the manufacturers. This is particularly true with respect to the parts which are obsolete.

Since they are to have built this list by taking complete inventories of the parts, and since the list itself is so extensive, it is Mr. Horton's opinion that they would need at least eight to ten years or four year supply. Therefore, if we could order these purchases, after proper clearance, as being a "top priority point", furnishing somewhere between 75 and 80% of the list, that should be the limit of our help. About 10% can be delivered on an AA-1 priority but most of the companies require an AA-1 to get any reasonable delivery.

Inasmuch as China Defense Supplies, Inc. have already been advised of this list by Mr. Lusey, it might place this office in an embarrassing position if it were turned down at this stage. The ill will incurred might hamper future operations with China.

Mr. Horton also supplies this additional information - Major Hsiao of Chinese Intelligence has stated that he is very discouraged over the lack of assistance to the Chinese. Unofficially also, Dr. Soong's office has stated that they will "do anything" to cooperate with this office in China if we will assist them in getting radio equipment.



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the official go-ahead. In the meantime, equipment is already tested, packed and ready for shipment by both plane and by boat.

I am attaching to this memorandum a suggested cable to be sent to Mr. Gunther and have prepared a similar cable to send to Mr. Shepardson, along with suggested letters to them for Captain Huot to take with him.

There are also two copies of the memorandum attached in case you want to send one to Colonel Donovan; the other I thought might go to Mr. Crosswell for Major Bruce's information.



Colonel Goodfellow

Sept. 16, 1942

Major Lowman

## ENGLISH FACILITIES - COMMUNICATIONS

The English station would now be well under way if the Cairo-Beyrouth Expedition had not been given first preference.

As you know, we have been carrying forward an exchange of telegrams between Col. Gantner and the Communications Section with the aid of the British here (Mr. Bourgeois and Col. Sweet-Scott), endeavoring to obtain information and certain permissions by cable. These are now pretty well clarified.

In the meantime, Captain Must has been working closely with us here and has become fully acquainted with our objective and our operations. He is already well acquainted with the London office and his contacts with the British are excellent. He plans to leave Saturday of this week, to be followed shortly by Mr. van Dassel, who will act as engineering adviser. Mr. van Dassel is chief engineer for the Dutch and, after some negotiation, they have agreed to lend him to us in order to get under way. He has only to be cleared by the State Department. We plan to use him in a temporary capacity until the allotment comes through and we are able to replace him with a permanent commissioned officer-engineer.

As soon as Captain Must has worked out plans abroad, we are ready to ship the necessary equipment which has already been ordered. And again, if the allotment plan is approved, we will soon have the personnel to man it.

Incidentally, as to the Cairo-Beyrouth Expedition, despite our lack of allotment, we have already a chief engineer, an assistant engineer and station operators ready to go. They are now being trained and are only awaiting

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the official go-ahead. In the meantime, equipment is already tested, packed and ready for shipment by both plane and by boat.

I am attaching to this memorandum a suggested cable to be sent to Mr. Gunther and have prepared a similar cable to send to Mr. Shepardson, along with suggested letters to them for Captain Root to take with him.

There are also two copies of the memorandum attached in case you want to send one to Colonel Donovan; the other I thought might go to Mr. Crosswell for Major Bruce's information.